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Abstract  
UASs form a large part of the fighting ability of the advanced military forces. In particular, these 
systems that carry confidential information are subject to security attacks. Accordingly, an Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) has been proposed in the proposed design to protect against the security 
problems using the human immune system (HIS). The IDSs are used to detect and respond to attempts 
to compromise the target system. Since the UASs operate in the real world, the testing and validation 
of these systems with a variety of sensors is confronted with problems. This design is inspired by HIS. 
In the mapping, insecure signals are equivalent to an antigen that are detected by antibody- based 
training patterns and removed from the operation cycle. Among the main uses of the proposed design 
are the quick detection of intrusive signals and quarantining their activity. Moreover, SUAS-HIS 
method is evaluated here via extensive simulations carried out in NS-3 environment. The simulation 
results indicate that the UAS network performance metrics are improved in terms of false positive rate, 
false negative rate, detection rate, and packet delivery rate.  
Keywords: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Security threats, IDS, HIS, Routing security, SUAS-HIS  
 
1 Introduction 
UASs or Aerial vehicles networks (AVNs) are defined as any individual aerial vehicle either in 
communication with other vehicles, such as a Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with another UAV 
(U2U), and a UAV with an Satellite (U2S), or are in communication with stationary infrastructures 
such as an UAV with Traffic control tower (U2T), and a UAV with Ground station (U2G) [1]. A 
typical scenario for communication among the UAVs is demonstrated in Figure 1. This scenario 
includes multiple components and utilizes various links for communication. Each link is responsible 
for transmitting certain types of data and information. In general, according to type of information 
being transmitted, there should exist three different types of links in these networks, namely radio 
communication, U2U and Satellite link. In the radio communication links, telemetry data, video, 
audio, and control information are carried. Moreover, satellite links are responsible for carrying GPS, 
weather, and meteorological information, in addition to the data carried by the radio communication 
links. Employing UASs in the networks for ballistic missile defense is one of their applications with 
the highest level of vitality. In such applications, the tasks for the UAVs are usually patrolling an 
intermediary land stretched between the site where the ballistic missile is launched, and its intended 
target. Since ballistic missiles can cruise at an extremely high speeds, they mandate the use of quick 
 
 
 
detection methods to track and to eliminate. In specific, to increase the chance of successfully 
intercepting a ballistic missile, it is essential to have swift detection and tracking system, capable of 
detecting and tracking the missile right after it is launched. The designers working on ballistic missile 
defense networks are aiming the system to be capable of intercepting the missiles during their initial 
2 to 5 minutes of flight, which is called the boost phase. During the boost phase, if the trajectory of 
the missile is directly away from the trajectory of the UAV, it will easily recede from the range of the 
sensors on the UAV. Hence, the routing of the information used in the network of the sensors of the 
ballistic missile should be addressed using networks of hybrid wireless sensors capable of complying 
with high availability and requirements mandated due to security. To demonstrate the UAVs’ 
applications that have an innate time sensitivity, and to signify the urgency of providing security in 
communication channels, this case is discussed in the following paper [2, 3]. However, despite the 
advantage’s UAVs provide through various applications, since there are situations where no pilot 
monitors the activities, they are potentially vulnerable against cyber threats. This intensifies the 
emergence to design secure and reliable UASs and overcome the challenges to avoid damage and 
destruction to other systems as well as human lives [2, 3]. 
      A number of attacks, such as Wormhole (WH), Black hole (BH), Gray hole (GH), and Fake 
Information Dissemination (FID), illegally penetrate the system. Once an unmanned system is affected 
by an attack, removing the threat and bringing the system back online is a laborious task. It should be 
mentioned that the common methods to secure information, such as encryption or intrusion detection 
[4], are inadequate when dealing with such risks. To elaborate, the mentioned schemes do not consider 
the sensor and actuator measurements compatibility factor with the physical process and control 
mechanism of the UAV, which are substantial to the protection scheme. In the SUAS-HIS proposed 
design, the malicious UAV is robust against four lethal attacks (WH, BH, GH, and FID) so that 
intrusive operations are quickly identified and removed from the spying missions or top-secret 
information surveillance. The proposed schema also improves critical standards of quality of service 
including detection rates, false positive rates and false negative rates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Typical UAS communication scenario. 
 
    The paper presented here is organized as the following. Section 2 presents the cyber security threats 
and detection schemes. Section 3 presents the HIS. In Sect. 4 brings the proposed SUAS-HIS 
framework. Moreover, parameters utilised for performance evaluation are investigated and simulation 
results are discussed in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, the paper is concluded. 
 
2 Cyber security threats and detection schemes 
In the following section, we are going to discuss the following issues: cyber security threats targeting 
UAVs, detection schemes to provide protection for the UAS. 
2.1 Cyber Security Threats 
UASs are prone to cyber-security threats and function degradation, be them active threats or passive, 
due to the fact that they rely on wireless channels for communication. A list of major cyber security 
threats targeting UAVs is provided in Figure 2. In this paper, the following vulnerabilities are of 
interest: 
- Wormhole Attack: WH attacks are a major threatening attack on UAVs. In WH attacks, a hostile 
node receives data packets at a certain position in UAV, and tunnels the packets to another hostile 
node at a distant point, which regulates the packets to its neighbouring nodes. Establishing this 
tunnel is available through multiple methods, such as a channel established out of band, an 
encapsulated packet, or even a high-powered transmission. In these methods, the packet 
transmitted through tunnels are received rather promptly or with less hop counts compared to 
ordinary packets, which are transmitted through a multi-hop route. Through this technique, an 
illusion is established that the two tunnel end points are close [5]. Therefore, the hostile nodes are 
established as decoys between the source and destination nodes, and are able to perform 
subversions such as packet droppings and manipulation. 
- Black Hole Attack: In this attack, a BH node transmits a forged RREP upon receiving an RREQ 
packet, claiming shorter and unexpired route, even if the destination entry is missing from the 
routing table. When the fabricated RREP packet reaches the source node, a route through this 
malicious intermediate node is established, to discard all legitimate RREP messages transmitted 
from other intermediate and destination nodes. Therefore, through misleading the source node, BH 
node successfully attracts the data traffic to that destination. Then, instead of forwarding the 
incoming messages, the BH node drops all the data packets. When a transmission route is forged, 
the BH node resets the hop count to a very low value, and the number of destination sequence to a 
very high value to increase the acceptance chance at the source node. the BH attack can also launch 
from the source node via fabricating fields-source sequence numbers in RREQ packets and hop 
counts, resulting in poisoning the routing tables in intermediate nodes as well as the destination 
nodes [6]. 
- Grey Hole Attack: In grey hole attacks, data transmission in the network is interrupted by 
malicious nodes via transmitting false routing information. Since the origin of the malicious nodes 
are unpredictable, grey hole attack is regarded as a BH attack extension. A node may function as 
both malicious and normal. This attack interrupts route discovery process and causes diminution 
in throughput and packet delivery ratio [7].  
- FID attack: An instance of an FID attack is when a fake GPS signal is transmitted by the attacker 
in order to variate the route of the drone. To do this, the attacker should broadcast interferences 
between the drone and the pilot, to deteriorate the location estimated for the drone. In studies 
related to wireless communications [8], there has been various security strategies proposed to 
overcome an FID attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  UAS cyber security threats 
2.2 Detection schemes 
The challenges in securing AVNs or UASs using methods to provide cyber detection, and the existing 
security schemes in literature are discussed in.  
    Security threats targeting UAV systems are analysed in [9] and a cyber-security threat model is 
proposed that illustrates plausible attack directions. The model proposed here assists designers and 
UAV systems operators in understanding the system threat profiles so as to provide addressing various 
vulnerabilities in the system, identifying high profile threats, and selecting mitigation techniques.     
     In [10], the authors proposed a security framework to provide protection against malicious behaviour 
targeting SFA2 communication systems in aircrafts. As the numerical results presented in this paper 
indicate, employing the proposed security framework results in detection and prediction rates with high 
accuracy compared to the intrusion detection methods proposed earlier. 
    In [11], an adaptive IDS based on device specifications is proposed to detect suspicious UAVs in 
cooperative operations, where operation continuity is substantial. The proposed IDS system audits the 
UAVs in a distributed system to determine whether they are functioning normally or if they are under 
malicious attacks. What they are investigating in this paper is the effectiveness of the proposed rule-
based UAV IDS (BRUIDS) behaviour on reckless, random, and opportunistic intrusive behaviours 
(common cyber-attack behavioural methods). The proposed method bases the audition on behavioural 
rules to swiftly assess the survivability of a UAV under malicious attacks. 
     A cooperative IDS based on machine learning is proposed in [12], which is capable of exploiting 
the data provided from the history efficiently to provide the capability of making decisions proactively. 
To elaborate, the basis of the model proposed here is employing a de-noising auto encoder (DA) as a 
building block in order to build a deep neural network. The reason for employing DA is its capability 
of learning reconstruction of feedbacks of IDS from partial feedbacks. This capability enables us to, in 
situations where there are no complete feedbacks available from any of the IDSs, make proactive 
decisions regarding occurrence of any suspicious intrusion. 
    Rani et al. [13] reviewed the UAV vulnerabilities against attacks. To do so, they provided a general 
overview over the common hacking methods and the existing defensive, preventive, and trust strategies 
to avoid damages caused by attacks. To demonstrate the severe consequences of hackings and highlight 
the significance of developing novel defensive methods, they implemented a hacking procedure on a 
commercially available UAV named the Parrot AR. Drone. What is demonstrated is that the hacker can 
cause damages beyond repair and obtain full control over the UAV through compromising the 
operator/UAV communication link. Moreover, he can regenerate the flight trajectory using Robot 
Operating System (ROS)–based tools. Studies like this aid in identifying the threats and highlighting 
the significance of securing these systems against threats.  
 
2 Security framework aircraft 
UAS cyber 
security 
threats
wormhole 
attack
Grayhole 
attack
FID attack
Black hole 
attack
    Sedjelmaci et al. [14] proposed a system to protect the UAVs against vital threats; threats targeting 
data integrity and network availability. The proposed system employs a cyber-detection mechanism to 
detect deteriorating attacks promptly, upon unfolding. A major issue this paper studied was minimizing 
the false flags; since classifying a legitimate node may compromise the security system efficiency. 
Hence, to address the issue, this paper proposed a model to estimate threats based on Belief approach.  
    In [15], Brust et al. proposed a defensive system for UAVs to intercept and escort a malicious aircraft 
off the flight zone. The proposed defensive system is a UAV swarm, capable of self-organizing its 
formation in the event of detecting an intruder, and chasing the malicious UAV as a networked 
defensive swarm. In this paper, to provide a fully localized approach, the authors utilised the principles 
of modular design. An innovative auto balancing clustering process is developed to realise the 
formation based on interception and capture. The simulation results revealed that the resulting 
networked defensive UAV swarm is flexible against communication losses.  
    Yoon et al. [16], proposed a solution to network channel or physical hardware hijacking of 
commercial UAVs by anonymous attackers. The solution proposed here was to exploit an additional 
encrypted communication channel, an authentication algorithm, and perform DoS attack through 
Raspberry Pi to maintain UAV control in hijacking situations. The resulting system shows high 
applicability to commercial UAVs.  
    Sedjelmaci et al. [17] proposed an IDRF to protect the UAV network against threats targeting 
integrity of the data and availability of network. To our knowledge, this is the only instance of 
developing a hybrid-detection technique in UAV networks (i.e., a combination of detection methods 
based on rules and anomaly detection techniques), while considering the energy constraints of UAV 
nodes. Simulation results demonstrated in [14] reveals a high attack detection ratio and low false-
positive alarms. Plus, the proposed framework requires low communication overhead for a quick 
response to detected attacks.  
    In [18], Gao et al. presented a novel distributed algorithm for a team of UAVs to provide an online 
solution for a self-organization problem in a mission based on search and attack in a hostile 
environment. This problem requires solving a global optimisation problem, where the proposed 
distributed SAMSOA separates into a number of local optimisation problems. To do so, each UAV is 
considered as an individual subsystem and is assigned a dedicated processor, to solve its local 
optimisation problem. On the other hand, exchanging information in the team enables each subsystem 
to optimise its decision according to multiple UAVs system. The proposed algorithm considers two 
separate flight modes, namely normal flight mode and threat avoidance flight mode. In normal mode, 
the modelled search–attack mission maximises the surveillance coverage ratio, while minimising the 
existence time for each target. Then, an improved distributed ACO algorithm is designed to generate 
proper path points. Finally, the path points are connected smoothly by a Dubins curve. 
    In [19], based on edge matching, a novel approach to detect targets is proposed for UAV formation. 
A potential function with windowed edges determines the field of attraction for the edges similar to the 
windowed edges. Then, the problem of detecting the targets based on the edges is formulated as an 
optimisation problem. Afterwards, to specify location, angle of rotation, and an arbitrary template scale 
over a specific image, this paper proposed an improved bird swarm algorithm named competitive bird 
swarm algorithm. To aid the local optimum obtained via the original Bird Swarm Algorithm, converge 
to global optimal point faster and with more stability, a strategy called “disturbing the local optimum” 
is proposed. In Table 1, a taxonomy of the common cyber-security threats detection methods developed 
to protect the UAS against malicious threats is highlighted. 
Table 1: Cyber security threats detection schemes for UAS. 
Security 
schemes 
The proposed design performance Advantages  Disadvantages / constraints 
[10] A thorough investigation on various schemes of cyber 
detection in AVN is carried out here. Plus, a number of 
cyber-attacks that are susceptible of occurring is 
highlighted in this network. Moreover, in order to detect 
and impede occurring of threats that aim communication 
systems in aircrafts, a security framework named SFA is 
proposed in this study. 
• high accuracy detection 
• high prediction rates 
• Need for additional 
hardware  
• low robustness  
• high complexity 
 
[13] The design uses the neural network techniques to defend 
against Wireshark attacks, password theft, Trojan virus 
and so on to have a safe UAV system 
• Full coverage of attacks: 
password theft, Wireshark, 
MITM attack, Trojan virus and 
DDoS attack 
• Flexibility of the design 
High intelligence in using neural 
networks 
• Information about all 
UAVs in the IDS agent 
• Increased overhead 
[9] In this design, various security threats for UAV systems 
have been analyzed cyber-security threat model have 
been proposed to detect possible paths affected by the 
attack. This model uses three important communication 
components in aircraft carriers. The model also helps 
designers and users of UAV systems to detect various 
system threats and apply various techniques to eliminate 
these types of threats to reduce the effects of these types 
of attacks. 
• Simple architecture 
• Covering more attacks 
• Need for additional 
hardware  
• Low accuracy rate 
 
[11] In this design an adaptive specification-based system is 
used for detecting UAV in which the IDS3 agent is used 
in a distributed system to detect whether the UAVs are 
normal or malicious  
 
• Using Ant Colony Multiple 
Clustering Model  
• High accuracy in detecting 
attacks 
• Reduced false positive rate 
• Reduced false negative rate 
• Continuity of operation 
• High overhead in 
detecting attacks 
• Not covering more lethal  
• Need for additional 
hardware 
[14] This paper proposes a cyber-security system to protect 
UAVs from cyber-attacks that disturb the data integrity 
and access the network. To face with this lethal attack, 
an attack estimation model has been proposed based on 
the belief method 
• Has high speed and high 
accuracy in detecting cyber-
attacks, Has the lowest false 
positive rate, Has the lowest 
false negative rate 
• Not covering other 
lethal attacks 
• High energy 
consumption 
 
[15] The design offers an air defense system to defend 
malicious UAVs outside the flying area. The proposed 
UAV defense system includes an air defense capability 
that can organize itself in the event of intrusion detection 
and track the malicious UAV as a network shooter 
 
• The use of the modular concept 
for a completely localized 
approach 
• The clustering process with 
automatic equilibrium to 
realize the formation of the 
UAVs and capture their 
formation 
• Resistance to intruding UAVs 
• Excessive blocking of 
maneuvers 
• Random noise 
generation in three 
directions that injects 
the overhead into the 
network 
• Not covering most 
lethal attacks 
[16] In this study, a method was developed to prevent the 
abduction of network channels or physical hardware by 
unidentified attackers on commercial airless systems. 
This paper proposes an additional encrypted 
communication channel, authentication algorithm, and 
denial of service attack through the likelihood of pi and 
its high applicability in commercial UAV systems 
• Accurate identification of the 
attackers 
• Sending data securely for the 
use of two channels with high 
reliability 
 
• High overhead 
operation due to the use 
of encryption channels 
• Need for additional 
hardware 
• High communication 
delay 
[17] In this design, a set of detection and response techniques 
is proposed for monitoring UAV behaviors and 
categorized them into a suitable list (normal, abnormal, 
suspicious and destructive UAV) according to cyber 
threats. 
• Smart activation of the 
intrusion monitoring process 
• High detection rate 
• Low communication 
overhead 
• Rapid intruder detection 
• Need for additional 
hardware 
 
     The previous works to design IDS for the UAS have been listed in Table 2 (”-” indicates the 
indefinite characteristics). 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of the approaches for UAS literature. 
References Placement schema Detection schema Attack type Validation schema 
[12] Centralized Hybrid Cooperative attack _ Simulation  
[13] Hybrid Anomaly-based DoS _ Simulation  
[9] Distributed Signature-based Cyber-security attack _ None  
[11] Hybrid Hybrid Cyber-attack _ Simulation  
[14] Hybrid Hybrid Vital attacks _ Simulation  
[15] Distributed Signature-based MIMA, replay and impersonation attack _ Simulation  
[16] – Signature-based DoS attacks _ Empirical  
[17] Hybrid Anomaly-based DDoS _ Empirical  
[18] – Signature-based DoS attacks _ None  
[19] Distributed Signature-based Distributed attack _ Simulation  
 
3 HIS  
HIS is the basic protection system of human that supports the human to survive environmental threats 
and diseases. Moreover, by resembling the internet to human beings in a number of ways, it can be 
said that an immune system could be developed for the internet based on the fundamentals of HIS. 
Immunity system refers to all bodily mechanisms responsible in protecting the body against 
detrimental agents in the environment such as microorganisms and their products, chemicals, drugs 
and pollen grains. The HIS is comprised of three defensive lines functioning in cooperation. The first 
layer consists of skin, mucous membranes, and secretions of skin. As for the second layer, phagocytic 
white blood cells, antimicrobial proteins, and the inflammatory responses are the subsections. Finally, 
the third layer, which is the specific defensive mechanisms, includes lymphocytes and antibodies. 
Antibodies respond to particular microorganisms, aberrant body cells, toxins and other substances 
marked by foreign molecules, in specific ways. The human immunity system is of two types: Innate 
immunity system, and acquired immunity system [20, 21]. Figure 3 illustrates the lymphoid organs, 
and their main functions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  HIS structures [22] 
 
3.1 HIS Algorithm 
As discussed in the previous section, the HIS is a rather complicated mechanism, capable of 
protecting the body against a tremendous set of unnecessary pathogens. This mechanism HIS is 
constructed upon is exceptionally efficient, most notably in self and non-self-antigens distinction. A 
non-self-antigen is any external factor that can initiate an immune response such as a bacteria or an 
attack. On the other hand, self-antigens are on the opposite side of non-self-antigens. Self-antigens 
are the living organism’s own cells. The five main theories regarding HIS algorithms are affinity, 
clonal selection, and negative selection. 
- Affinity: Different models are used in HIS to calculate the affinity between antibodies (defending) 
and antigens (attacking). The affinity model is very important because the capability of detection 
relies on the affinity between the antigen and the detector. Let's assume that the coordinates of an 
antibody are given by ( )1,  2,  ,  Abi Abi Abi Abin=  and the coordinates of an antigen are
( )1,  2,  ,  Agi Agi Agi Agin=  ; the distance between them, ,D  is the affinity [23]. We can use Eq. 
(1) to calculate D . 
 
   0 1 m 0 1 mLet R = r , r ,..., r      ,         S = s ,s ,.  ..,s   (1) 
 
m
0 0
i=0
 Manhattan   D= r -s  
 
 
m
0 0
i=0
Hamming    D= δ=1  if  r ¹s ,  if  otherwise  
 
 
( )
m
2
0 0
i=o
 E     D= r -uclidea sn    
where r and s respectively represent different characteristics of columns, m is the number of data. 
_____ 
 
 
- Clonal Selection Algorithm: Clonal selection describes a response to an antigen by the immune 
system. The antibodies that can recognize the antigens multiply and are chosen over ones that do 
not. This allows detectors to clone their parents by a mutation mechanism with high rates while 
the antibodies which are self-reactive get eliminated. This act is known as clonal selection. 
CLONALG was the algorithm created by De Castro which is based on clonal selection [24]. This 
algorithm takes into account all counts about cloning the best antibodies, affinity maturation, 
taking out non-stimulated antibodies, and maintaining diversity. Clonal selection has a great 
strategy for optimization and pattern recognition. This helps evolve the immune system, so it can 
recognize the antigens that it met in the past. 
- Negative Selection Algorithm: According to a general definition, a negative selection algorithm 
is any algorithm with classification aim that imitates the negative selection process in the 
vertebrate immune system; an idea proposed and developed first by Forrest et al [25]. Such 
algorithms are part of one-class classifiers; meaning their training sessions are performed on un-
labelled data, which are sampled from a certain sub-region of the problem domain. Then, the 
results are utilised to determine whether the new and unseen data points belong to the same sub-
region or not. The algorithms for negative selection are based on agents that are called detectors, 
which can patterns matching with small problem domain subsets. For instance, in the problem 
domain illustrated as  
5
0,1U = , consisting binary strings of length 5, the pattern 1***1 is a 
candidate for being a detector, since it matches with all the strings starting and ending with 1. 
[23].  
- Learning: In an HIS, agents learn to distinguish, through actions such as negative selection, clonal 
selection, danger theory, or human immune networks, self and non-self [24]. 
- Adaptation: The immune system is capable of initiating attacks on invaders that the innate 
defensive system is incapable of removing, via an acquired or adaptive immunity system. Such 
adaptive immune system can be directed to specific types of invasions, and can be modified via 
being exposed to agents imposing such invasions. It generally includes white blood cells named 
lymphocytes. In specific, B and T-cell lymphocytes facilitate the recognition process and aid in 
destroying specific types of substances. Immunogens (or antigens) are substances that can 
generate response from the lymphocytes. However, antigens do not attack the microorganisms 
themselves. Instead, substances existing in the microorganisms including toxins or enzymes are 
considered foreign by the immune system. Responses created by the immune system that are of 
adaptive nature normally target the provoking antigens and thus, are referred to as antigen-specific 
[24]. 
    In Algorithm 1, the pseudo code for Negative Selection Algorithm is demonstrated [26]. 
 
4 The proposed SUAS-HIS framework 
In the following section, we design a cyber-security threats-immune schema by employing the HIS 
algorithm. The proposed system consists of five steps, such as SUAS-HIS network model is discussed 
in Sect, 4.1. Next section defines the information exchange pattern of UAS. Section 4.3 describes 
Motion direction of UAV. Details of SUAS-HIS schema is discussed in Sect. 4.4. Security and 
performance evaluation is discussed in Sect. 4.5, and major parts of the immune system and conducted 
mapping is discussed in Sect. 4.6. 
4.1 SUAS-HIS network model 
We consider a UAS network, in which UAVs are deployed in an infinite three-dimensional (3D) 
Euclidean space according to a homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP). The UAVs have a 
maximum one-hop communication range. A UAV can transmit information to the intended 
destination UAV directly, or via a relay by one or more UAVs. The multi-hop scheme is decode-and-
forward, in which the relaying UAV decodes an arriving packet and then transmits to the next hop. 
Also, in SUAS-HIS network model, a safe solution is provided to secure the UAVs, which is effective 
on two ways: First, it has high detection accuracy and low false positive and negative rates and 
second, it detects and isolates attacks quickly. In the proposed method, the security issues such as 
WH, BH, GH and FID attacks that could target the UAV are prevented. In order to detect the attacks 
with a high accuracy, other features could be added in addition to those of Table 3. 
Algorithm 1: Pseudo code for Negative Selection Algorithm 
1:   Procedure Negative Selection Algorithm 
2:     Input: A S ⊂ Ui  ("self-set"); a set Mo  ⊂ Ui  ("monitor set"); an integer ni  
3:     Output: For each element mo  ∈ Mo , either "normal UAV" or "malicious UAV". 
4:              // phase I: Training  
5:                  de ← empty set 
6:                        while   | De |   < ni     do 
7:                                             de ← the random detector set 
8:                                          if de does not match any element of Si  then 
9:                                                 insert de  into De  
10:                                        End if 
11:                    End while 
12:             // phase II: Classification  
13:                              For each mo  ∈ mo  do 
14:                     if mo  matches any detector de  ∈ De  then 
15:            output " mo  is non-self" (an attacker) 
16:                     else 
17:                                                    output " mo  is self" 
18:                     End if 
19:                             End For 
20s: End Procedure 
 4.2 Information exchange pattern of UAS 
A typical process of exchanging information is as follows. Initially, a source ground station (
srcG ) 
delivers a message to a UAV (
1U ). This UAV then travels a distance ( 1D ), in order to meet and 
deliver the message to another UAV (
2U ). Next, this UAV delivers the message to another UAV (
3U ), and it continues in the same manner until the final UAV ( NU ) delivers the message to the ground 
station in the destination (
DSTG ). With the aim of minimizing the latency in delivering end-to-end 
packets, each UAV participating in this process is mandated to meet the next UAV precisely at the 
designated time. 
In real environments however, since the UAVs have different performances due to variations in 
engines and environmental uncertainties, they fly at different velocities and therefore, it is unrealistic 
to expect that all UAVs will be capable of following a similar pattern. For instance, UAVs with higher 
speeds may travel longer distances compared to others. In addition, the communication line between 
two UAVs can only be established when they are in the communication range. Therefore, it is 
mandatory to develop a collaboration among UAVs. Once two UAVs are in the communication 
range, or they are in the same connection area, they can exchange data packets. This process is time 
consuming. When a UAV is travelling outside the connection area, or in a connectionless area, no 
data packet exchange is likely to occur. 
4.3 Motion Direction of the UAV 
To provide motion for the UAVs, this study employed the smooth turn (ST) mobility model. Using 
ST enables the UAVs to have smoother trajectories, which includes flying in straight trajectories or 
making turns with larger radius. Therefore, ST is being widely employed for the purpose of analyzing 
UASs. This model is capable of capturing the acceleration correlation of the UAVs in both temporal 
and spatial domains, and is accommodating for the purpose of design and analysis. As stated in [27], 
there exists a uniform distribution for the stationary node of the ST model, which results in a series 
of closed-form connectivity. 
 
 
Table 3: Cyber security threats features 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The major acronyms and notations used in this paper are provided Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Cyber security threats Features 
Wormhole attack   Data injection rate 
Black hole attack   Data injection rate 
Gray hole attck   Data injection rate 
FID   Messages modified rate 
Table 4: Major acronyms and notations used in this paper. 
Acronyms Abbreviated acronyms  Notation Abbreviated notations 
3NS −  Network Simulator 3  RREQ  Route Request 
NAM  Network Animator  RREP  Route Reply 
IDS  Intrusion Detection System  DA  Denoising Auto Encoder 
HIS  Human Immune System  
SUAV  Source UAV  
SUAS HIS−  Securing of Unmanned Aerial Systems by 
Human Immune System 
 
DUAV   Destination UAV  
UAS   Unmanned Aerial Systems  
sT  Surveillance Threshold 
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles  DR  Detection rate 
AVN  Aerial Vehicles Networks  
srcG  Ground station source 
2U U  UAV-UAV  
DSTG  Ground station destination 
2U S  UAV-Satellite  m   Malicious 
2U T  UAV- Traffic control tower  ( )mP r   Probability malicious (route) 
2U G  UAV-Ground station  SSI   Signal Strength Intensity 
GPS  Global Positioning System  
rF   Fitness route 
WH  Wormhole  
sbP   Probability subversive behavior 
BH  Blackhole  
sN   Number of packets 
GH  Grayhole  iRTT  Round Trip Time 
FID  Fake Information Dissemination  MaxRTT  Maximum RTT 
FPR  False positive rate  
iSSI  Signal Strength Intensity i 
FNR  False negative rate  MaxSSI  Maximum SSI 
TPR  True positive rate  Agi  Anti-gen 
TNR  True negative rate  Abi  Anti-body 
PC  Packet counter  D  Distance 
SFA  Security Framework Aircraft  R  Route 
ROS  Robot Operating System  AS  Antigen Self 
DoS  Denial of Service  
UAVSPC  The number of packets sent 
ACO  Ant Colony Optimization    
RTT  Round Trip Time    
 
 
 
4.4 Details of the proposed method: Securing the UASs against security threats using HIS 
After the source UAV or ground station receives the first response message, the default air systems 
detect the shortest route and sends packets by receiving the first message from other UAVs. 
Accordingly, it pays no attention to the security of the communication channel (the absence of a WH, 
BH, a GH and FID attacks). However, in the proposed method, the UAV examines the security of 
routes by the HIS algorithm and then sends packets through the safest route. The overall idea of the 
proposed method is that as in the HIS, Abi  are taught to discover and remove malignant Agi , here a 
set of rules are created and updated to track the routes infected by attacking UAVs and exclude them 
from the cycle. The proposed mapping and comparison between the HIS and UAS under the attack 
is shown in Table 4. The details on how to use the mapping are provided in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: The mapping between HIS and UASs. 
Human Body UASs 
Antigen Structure The set of all routes connecting the source to destination UAV. 
Antibody Structure Attack-detection rules based on ( SSI , RTT), and packets count 
backwards from the destination). 
Colonization Reproduction of antibodies that best match the antigens. 
Affinity value The sum of SSI , RTT, and packets count backwards from the 
destination. 
Mutation Under identical conditions, the fastest route response is selected. 
 
 
4.5 Assessing the safety and performance of the routes with UAVs 
At this stage, the intended antibodies are designed to provide security and performance for both UAVs 
and ground stations simultaneously. This design is done in the following three phases: 
Phase 1: Initial assessment of candidate routes using Hello packets 
At this phase, each route for which the route response is received is tested in terms of security. 
Accordingly, a "Hello packet” is sent through each route, and the target UAV is required to send a 
confirmation packet for those routes containing the UAVs if the "Hello packet" is received. 
Obviously, if a route is affected with malicious UAVs, the “Hello packet" will not be delivered and 
the confirmation packet will not be received. Under these conditions, the probability of rout 
contamination increases i.e. the ( )mP r value for the r route increases but if the “Hello packet" reaches 
its destination, a confirmation packet will be received, which means that there is no malicious UAVs, 
so the ( )mP r value decreases. The process of sending “Hello packet" is repeated 4 times. 
Initial value of the Pm(r) variable: If, according to the attacker UAV detection mechanism the route 
is confirmed, the initial ( )mP r value will be zero but if the route is not approved, ( )mP r value will be 
100. Then, in order to update it, the source UAV sends a "Hello packet" four times from all possible 
routes to the destination UAV. If the confirmation packet is sent by the destination UAV, 25 units 
will be deducted from the ( )mP r variable; but if the confirmation packet is not sent by the destination 
UAV, 15 units will be added to the ( )mP r variable. This is repeated 4 times and ( )mP r is updated for 
all routes (threshold value). If the ( )mP r value is greater than 50, that route will be set aside as a 
contaminated route (rejected). Otherwise, that route will be sent to the next part i.e. Phase 2 to 
evaluate the safety and efficiency of the routes. 
 
Phase 2: Assessing and discovering routes containing malicious UAVs 
Reverse packet counting from destination UAV: As the data packet reaches the destination UAV, 
the destination UAV sends a query response packet to the UAV at the source route (data transmission 
route) at a distance of 2-hops. If the following route indicates the route between the source and 
destination UAVs, 0 1 2 ( 3) ( 2) ( 1). . . . . . . .S n n n n DUAV UAV UAV UAV UAV UAV UAV UAV UAV− − − , then the UAVD 
sends a packet to the ( 1)nUAV − located 2 hops away from the UAVD. Query request is used to find the 
number of data packets sent by a UAV to the UAV used in its next hop. ( 1)nUAV − sends a query packet 
to the destination UAVD. The response to query packet, which contains the number of data packets 
sent by a UAV on the source route, is sent to the UAV by its adjacent hop. The destination UAV 
checks the query response to see whether the previous hop (for example nUAV ) has sent all data 
packets received from its previous ( 1)nUAV − . If not correct, the destination UAV will add both ( 1)nUAV −  
and UAVn to the suspect list. If it is correct, it means that the two UAVs participated in sending data 
correctly. Therefore, the destination UAV re-sends a new query request to the ( 3)nUAV −  in the 2-hop 
distance from the ( 1)nUAV −  on the source route. Based on the received query request, the destination 
UAV explores whether ( 3)nUAV −  and ( 2)nUAV −  have sent all data packets they have received or not. 
This process continues until the query request reaches the UAV that the UAV has no previous hop at 
2-hops away on the source route.  Using the query response packets, the first row examines the 
behavior of sending the intermediate UAVs’ data on the route with high reliability from the source 
UAV through the destination UAV. If the difference in the number of packets transmitted between 
both intermediate UAVs exceeds the surveillance threshold, the destination UAV will mark both 
intermediate nodes as suspicious UAVs. The probability of subversive behavior sbP  between each of 
the two UAVs is calculated in accordance with Eq. (2). 
  2 1 1 2n n n n
UAV UAV UAV UAV
sb
s
SPC SPC
P
N
− − − −
− 
=  
 
                          
(2) 
Where, 
2 1n nUAV UAV
SPC
− −
represents the number of data packets transmitted by 2 1n nUAV UAV− − . If sb sP T , 
both of them 2nUAV −  and 1nUAV −  are malicious. Here the surveillance threshold is sT  and could range 
between 0 and 0.2 , and
sN  represents the packets sent from the source .UAV  The sT is for monitoring 
the packet loss rate in UAS networks. This means with how many lost packets in the network, we 
seek to discover malicious UAVs. If sT  is set to zero, it means that we expect all packets to reach the 
destination successfully and no packet to be lost. However, if sT  is set to 0.1, it means that it does not 
matter if up to 10 percent of the packets get lost and no action will be taken for discovering malicious 
UAVs but if it is more than 10 percent, we must seek to discover malicious UAVs according to the 
proposed method. Likewise, considering the value to be 0.2 means 20 percent of all the transmitted 
packets. Setting the surveillance threshold depends on the network size and the number of transmitted 
packets. 
 
Phase 3: Assessing the safety and efficiency of the routes that went through Phase 1 and Phase 
2 
Given that, the attacks show the number of hops below the actual value, if a route has a lower number 
of hops, the probability that the route is infected increases. Meanwhile, the low RTT and high SSI  of 
the UAVs on the route, in addition to improve the route safety in terms of attacks, it is also desirable 
based on the route performance. Therefore, the optimal route can be considered as a route that 
maximizes the rF index according to Eq. (3). 
  ( ), ir i i
i
SSIMaxRTT
F RTT SSI
RTT MaxSSI
   
= +   
  
                          
(3) 
The meaning of the equation 
i
MaxRTT
RTT
 
 
 
 is that the routes which have a lower RTT  will be chosen 
as the intended route.  
Since among the values equation 
i
MaxRTT
RTT
 
 
 
 yields as output for all the routes, the maximum value 
is selected as the shortest route.  
 
Example:        ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 5;             2 10;             3 20RTT route RTT route RTT route= = =   
According to the equation 
i
MaxRTT
RTT
 
 
 
, the output will be as follows: 
( )  20;            20 / 5 4;            20 /10 2;            20 / 20 1Max RTT all route = = = =   
As a result, according to the equation, the bigger number means that it had a smaller RTT and it 
will be selected as the output. 
The meaning of the equation i
SSI
MaxSSI
 
 
 
 is that the routes with higher SSI get selected as the 
intended route. Since among the values this equation yields for all routes, the maximum value is 
selected as the higher SSI . 
 
 
Example:    ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 5;            2 10;            3 20SSI route SSI route SSI route= = =   
According to the equation i
SSI
MaxSSI
 
 
 
, the output will be as follows: 
( )  20;           5 / 20 0.25;          1 0 / 20 0.5;           20 / 20 1Max SSI all route = = = =   
Therefore, according to the equation, a bigger number means it had a bigger SSI and gets selected 
as the output.  
By combining the RTT and SSI equation, the equation ( ), ir i i
i
SSIMaxRTT
F RTT SSI
RTT MaxSSI
   
= +   
  
 
was obtained. For the output of this equation, the maximum number will be the best and the most 
secure route. 
 
  ( ) ( )1 ( ) * ,SR m r i iUAV P r F RTT SSI= −                           (4) 
 
In Eq. (4), the ( )mP r  variable calculates the probability of the r candidate routes being malicious. On 
the other hand, ( )1 ( )mP r−  presents the probability of the r candidate routes being healthy. Also, 
equation ( ),r i iF RTT SSI  selects the route which has a low RTT and high SSI . By combining these 
two, we created the SRUAV  equation in order for routes to be selected from the r candidate ones which 
are less likely to be malicious. Therefore, the chosen route is the one which has both security and 
high performance.  
     Since malicious UAVs always insert their location incorrectly in the RREP packet, due to this 
problem, we use RTT to obtain the precise distance between UAVs in order to forward the packet to 
the UAV which has the shortest distance. Also, by calculating SSI for each UAV, we notice their 
fake signals. In order to deliver the desired package to a healthy UAV. By doing so, malicious 
activities of WH, BH, GH, and FID attacks will be prevented. 
Example: 
 1 0.25;( )mP route =     ; 2( ) 0.50mP route =      ; 3( ) 0.40mP route =  
According to the ( ) ( )1 ( ) * ,SR m r i iUAV P r F RTT SSI= −  equation, it will be as follows: 
( )1 1 0.25 *5 3.75Route = − =  
( )2 1 0.50 * 2.5 1.25Route = − =  
( )3 1 0.25 *1.25 0.9375Route = − =  
As seen in the examples, the route which had a lower RTT and a higher SSI was selected as the 
output. 
 
 
 
4.6 Major parts of the immune system and conducted mapping 
The proposed method is structured according to the flowchart shown in Figure 4: random population 
generation of antibodies (rules), Antigen structure (set of all routes from the target UAV to the 
destination UAV), matching, rejection of matched unsafe communication channels, completion of 
detector set (rules that detect routes infected by the attacker), storing in the safety memory and 
detector hyper mutation. 
 
Antibody and antigen structure: Antibody is considered as the three features of limiting the attacks 
( RTT , SSI and reverse packet counting from destination) and antigen is the total set of routes for 
which the route response are achieved.  
Affinity: As defined in the HIS, antibodies that have a stronger binding to an antigen than other 
antibodies are selected as a safe antibody for composition. In the proposed method, affinity is selected 
as routes with less RTT, high SSI  and reverse packet counting from destination. Otherwise, the 
candidate route will be eliminated. 
Match: In this section, the responses of the routes collected on the UAV of the source are compares 
in terms of the two below features and the safest route is selected. Meanwhile, the most important 
feature of the attacker detection mechanism is that they are modified over time and defined in a way 
that can be easily corrected and learned. 
Details of the first and second features of the antibody in matching section: These details are 
expressed in two following features: 
First feature )RTT between the source UAV and destination UAV): The RTT is calculated for all 
routes received from the source UAV to destination UAV. The objective of the first feature is to 
calculate the precise and correct distance between UAVs in order to prevent the malicious operation 
of the intruder UAV which makes its distance seem less. This is done using RTT. 
Second feature (SSI): The attacker UAV generates high-intensity signal to control the target UAV. 
In such detection, it collects all SSIs generated by the transmitters UAVs and then compares them 
with normal UAV SSIs. Accordingly, the suspicious transmitter signal and normal UAV signals are 
differentiated. The objective of the second feature is to distinguish the SSIs created by the malicious 
UAV from the ones created by healthy UAVs. This is done this way that we calculate the difference 
between the SSI with the highest signal and all other received SSIs. Now, if this difference is bigger 
than the threshold value, we conclude that the considered SSI is not safe and remove it. this step is 
performed on all received SSIs. The reason for comparing to the threshold value is that the intruder 
UAV wants to make the destructive attack (4 attacks we mentioned before) as close to the source 
UAVs as possible. This is because the malicious UAV being closer is the most dangerous type of 
attack since it will remove the most amount of data traffic. 
Completion of detector set: For all routes the ( )mP r  value of which is less than 50, the algorithm 2 
is used to choose the safest route. The pseudo code of the SUAS-HIS is given in Algorithm 2. 
According to algorithm 2, the rF function is calculated for each route and the route that has a larger 
number is selected as the safest route. 
 
Hyper mutation: Among the assessed routes, routes with almost identical conditions are transmitted 
to the hyper mutation stage so that the routes are assessed with a different criterion (under the equal 
terms, the fastest route response is selected) to select the safest route for UAVs. 
Registration in safety memory: routes that have the largest number in accordance with Eq. 3, are 
the safest route and are registered in the memory for later use. 
 
Algorithm 2: Pseudo code for SUAS-HIS schema 
1:   Initialize the Antigen collection time to 10s; 
2:   Initialize the Antigen towards min to 70s; 
3:   Initialize the Delay buffer size max to 1200; 
4:   Initialize the Storing time to 11s; 
5:   Initialize the Max number of antigens to 1200; 
6:   Let ( )mP r   the probability of the infected route; 
7:   Let R  denote the number of candidate route; 
8:   Let rF  denote the fitness route;   
9:   Let SRUAV  denote the immune route; 
10: Procedure Selecting immune route 
11:             1            For r To R Do=   
12:          ( ) 0.       ||       5  m A nI ttack Confirm dF P r ee Th =  
13:                                                          rPush out route  
14:                                  r to Inform other UAVsBroadcast route   
15:                      Else   
16:                                                 ( , ) ir i i
i
MaxRTT SSI
F RTT SSI
RTT MaxSSI
   
= +   
  
   
17:                                                 ( )1 ( ) * ( , )SR m r i iUAV P r F RTT SSI= −   
18:                                                           0.       ||    5      SR At ntI ack NotConfirmF U eAV d The=  
19:                                                                                      r to Inform other UAVsBroadcast route  
20:                                                          EndIf  
21:        EndIf   
22:        EndFor   
23: End Procedure 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Flowchart of the SUAS-HIS 
 
 
5 Evaluating the Performance 
To prevent threats of cyber security, we evaluate our proposed SUAS-HIS approach’s performance in 
the following section. 
 5.1 Performance metrics 
In this section, the effectiveness and performance of our proposed SUAS-HIS approach is thoroughly 
evaluated with comprehensive simulations. The results are compared with Cyber Security System,  
BRUIDS, and SFA approaches proposed in [9], [11] and [10], respectively. The false positive, false 
negative and detection ratio are evaluated.  
 
5.1.1 False positive rate 
FPR is defined as the division of the number of misbehaving UAVs being misdirected, to the overall 
count of UAVs currently well-behaving, as illustrated in Eq. (5). 
 
 
  *100
FPR
FPR
FPR TNR
 
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         Where:                 *100
TNR
TNR
TNR FPR
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(5) 
 
 
5.1.2 False negative rate 
FNR is the number of UAVs that are currently well-behaving, but are considered as malicious by the 
trust system, as demonstrated by Eq. (6). 
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5.1.3 Detection rate 
DR is defined as the division of the number of detected UAV currently misbehaving, to the overall 
number of actual nodes currently misbehaving. In other words, it is defined as the probability of 
successful identification of all security threats, as demonstrated in Eq. (7). 
 
 
 
*100
TPR
DR
TPR FNR
 
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            where                All TPR TNR FPR FNR= + + +    
(7) 
 
 
5.1.4 Packet Delivery Ratio 
As defined, Pocket Delivery Ratio results from dividing the total received packets of data at the 
destination UAV, to the total transmitted packets of data by the source UAV, denoted in percentage 
[28-30]. Eq. (8) demonstrates the average obtained PDR for N  experiments. 
 
1
1
1
* *100%
n
i
i
n
i
i
X
PDR
n
Y
=
=
=


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5.2 Simulation setup and comparing algorithms 
The difficulties in implementation and debugging UASs in real networks, raises the necessity to 
consider simulations as a fundamental design tool. The main advantage of simulation is simplifying 
analysis and protocol verification, mainly in large-scale systems. It is possible to employ a NAM in 
the Network Simulator (NS-3) [31, 32]  to visualise the results. In this section, the performance of 
our proposed approach is evaluated using NS-3 as the simulation tool, and the results are discussed 
further. It is worth mentioning that all SUAS-HIS, Cyber Security System, BRUIDS and SFA 
parameters and settings are considered to be equal [33]and [34, 35]. 
 
5.3 Simulation results and Analysis 
In the following section, the performance of SUAS-HIS in terms of security is analyzed presented in 
Table 5 [36]. In this paper, simulation with two different scenarios is evaluated for UAS networks. 
The first scenario has a variable number of UAVs from 100 to 400, fixed simulation time of 1400 
seconds, and a network size of 6000 by 6000. The second scenario has a fixed number of 400 UAVs, 
variable simulation time from 200 to 1400 seconds, and a network size of 4000 by 4000. Each 
scenario is run 4 times (according to a, b, c, and d diagrams). The first time, it is evaluated with a %7 
malicious UAV rate, the second time with a %14 malicious UAV rate, the third time with a %21 
malicious UAV rate, and the fourth time only with a variable simulation time from 200 to 1400. The 
UAV flies with constant speed of 180 m/s. In addition, some significant parameters employed are 
enlisted in Table 5. 
Table 5: Setting of simulation parameters. 
Parameters Value 
First scenario Number of UAVs: 100 to 400 
Simulation time: 1400 S (fixed) 
Network size (m x m): 6000 x 6000 
Second scenario 
 
Number of UAVs: 400 (fixed) 
Simulation time: 200 to 1400 S 
Network size (m x m): 4000 x 4000 
Channel type Channel/Wireless channel 
MAC Layer MAC/802.11.b  
Traffic type CBR 
UAV speed 180 m/s 
Transmission layer UDP 
Packet size 512 Byte 
Malicious UAV 0 - 0.30 
Type of attacks FID, BH, GH, and WH 
Transmission range 30 M 
 
Table 6-9 compares the performance of SUAS-HIS with that of Cyber Security System, BRUIDS 
and SFA in terms of FPR, FNR, DR, and PDR. 
Table 6: DR  (in %) of various frameworks with varying degree of malicious UAVs. 
Misbehaving 
UAV ratio 
                DR (%)  
   Cyber Security System  BRUIDS  SFA  SUAS HIS−  
0 96.63 95.3 95.2 99.5 
0.05 94.49 94.5 93.57 98.2 
0.10 85.46 86.1 86.8 96.38 
0.15 78.35 79.5 81.37 94.27 
0.20 69.19 72.8 75.43 92.28 
0.25 55.34 62.7 71.16 89.7 
0.30 51.14 59.7 65.67 87.4 
 
Table 7: FNR  (in %) of various frameworks with varying degree of malicious UAVs. 
Misbehaving 
UAV ratio 
                FNR (%)  
   Cyber Security System  BRUIDS  SFA  SUAS HIS−  
0 2.93 4.5 4.005 0.34 
0.05 3.43 5 5.08 0.86 
0.10 5.19 7.1 6.3 1.27 
0.15 10.63 9.7 8.37 2.62 
0.20 19.38 15.9 11.25 4.2 
0.25 28.2 21.4 13.76 7.83 
0.30 34.27 24.8 19.89 9.22 
 
Table 8: FPR  (in %) of various frameworks with varying degree of malicious UAVs. 
Misbehaving 
UAV ratio 
                FPR (%)  
   Cyber Security System  BRUIDS  SFA  SUAS HIS−  
0 3.3 3.1 4.25 0.42 
0.05 5.31 7.1 6.24 1.65 
0.10 14.05 13.9 13.01 3.41 
0.15 21 19.7 17.35 4.57 
0.20 29.38 26.8 24.62 7.63 
0.25 42.6 35.4 28.88 9.97 
0.30 46.67 39.4 34.09 11.83 
 
Table 9: PDR  (in %) of various frameworks with varying degree of malicious UAVs. 
Misbehaving 
UAV ratio 
                PDR (%)  
   Cyber Security System  BRUIDS  SFA  SUAS HIS−  
0 95.9 95.3 98.1 99.7 
0.05 82.4 85.4 91.2 95.4 
0.10 77.3 79.1 82.2 91.2 
0.15 65.3 71.3 74.3 87.3 
0.20 60.4 62.8 67.1 82.4 
0.25 50.9 54.3 61.2 79.1 
0.30 41.6 49.3 55.3 75.4 
 
 
Table 10 represents average values of various frameworks for all metrics under security threats. 
 
 
 
 Table 10: Average values of various frameworks for all metrics under security threats. 
Schemes    Detection rate FNR FPR PDR 
  Cyber Security System  Number of UAVs (7% of overall nodes)   77.91   10.04571429   18.21   72.2285714 
Number of UAVs (14% of overall nodes)   66.98714286   13.41714286   24.24285714   69.6114285 
Number of UAVs (21% of overall nodes)   50.64857143   18.17142857   31.24428571   64.5428571 
Simulation times   75.8   14.86142857   23.18714286   0.41 
 
 
BRUIDS  
 
Number of UAVs (7% of overall nodes)   80.38571429 6.81428571 11.7285714 73.7857142 
Number of UAVs (14% of overall nodes)   72.28571429 8.38571428 18.0571428 69.9571428 
Number of UAVs (21% of overall nodes)   53.24285714 14.4571428 22.6714285 66.8142857 
Simulation times  74.71428571 0.06371428 0.046 45.7142857 
 
 
SFA  
Number of UAVs (7% of overall nodes)   89.94714286   5.645714286   9.332857143   77.0285714 
Number of UAVs (14% of overall nodes)   77.37142857   6.605714286   14.6   71.2857142 
Number of UAVs (21% of overall nodes)   59.27142857   12.71428571   18.34   68.4914285 
Simulation times  81.31428571   9.807857143   18.34857143   0.61714285 
 
 
SUAS HIS−  
Number of UAVs (7% of overall nodes)   98.83   0.918571429   1.134285714   94.4171428 
Number of UAVs (14% of overall nodes)   92.37   3.477142857   9.668571429   84.4114285 
Number of UAVs (21% of overall nodes)   86.59285714   7.677142857   11.15285714   77.9128571 
Simulation times  93.96142857   3.762857143   5.64   0.91428571 
 
 
FPR: Figure 5 demonstrates the comparison of the proposed SUAS-HIS framework against three 
approaches, one game theory-based (SFA), the second adaptive behavior-rule specification-based 
(BRUIDS), and other one risk-based algorithm (Cyber Security System) frameworks. As shown in 
the Figure 5(a), when the number of normal UAVs ranged from 100 to 400 and the rate of malicious 
UAVs increased from 7% to 21%, the FPR generated by the proposed design had a slight and 
moderate growth compared to the other three designs. The FPR of the proposed design is less than 
3% when number of normal UAVs and the rate of malicious UAVs are equal to 400 and 7%, 
respectively. However, this amount is set to 20% for the SFA, 25% for the BRUIDS, and 35% for the 
Cyber Security System. The reason for the superiority of the proposed design is the rapid detection 
of malicious UAVs and their removal by cooperation between ground stations and normal UAVs that 
the process is performed by the trained rules stored in memory. Also, the other reason is that the 
SUAS-HIS detects security threats and isolates them from the UAS network, thereby decreasing the 
FPR that occurs as a result of the attacks. As shown in the Figure 5(a), (b), (c) and (d), SUAS-HIS 
decreases the FPR by more than 11.98, 14.87, and 25.13% those of SFA, BRUIDS, and Cyber 
Security System models, respectively.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 5: Comparison of the SUAS-HIS proposed scheme, Cyber Security System, BRUIDS and SFA models in term 
of FPR. 
 
Figure 6 shows the comparison results of the SUAS-HIS proposed scheme, in terms of FPR at 
different type of attacks and different ST . 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of the SUAS-HIS proposed scheme, in terms of FPR at different type of attacks and different ST . 
 
(a) (7% malicious UAV) (b) (14% malicious UAV) 
(c) (21% malicious UAV) (d) Simulation times 
FNR: Figure 7 shows the comparison of the SUAS-HIS proposed scheme, SFA, BRUIDS, and 
Cyber Security System models in term of FNR in lethal attacks. (a) Number of UAVs (7% 
malicious), (b) Number of UAVs (14% malicious), (c) Number of UAVs (21% malicious), (d) 
Simulation times respectively. As shown in the diagrams, the FNR of the SUAS-HIS proposed 
schema has increased slightly but this value is much higher in the SFA, BRUIDS, and Cyber Security 
System. In Figure 7(a), the FNR of the proposed schema is less than 2% when the number of normal 
UAVs is 400, but for the other three approaches, it is 12, 14 and 18% respectively. In Figure 7(b), 
when the rate of malicious UAVs is 14%, it is less than 4% in the proposed design but this amount 
is 7, 12, and 22% for the other three methods respectively. Figure 7(c) explains the FNR under 
security threats with number of UAVs (21% malicious UAV). The result indicates in Figure 7(d) 
that, with the traditional technique, the FNR during security threats at simulation time 200 is 
approximately 6%, which decreases to approximately 4% at 1400 second in a simulation time 
condition. As shown in the Figure 7(a), (b), (c) and (d), SUAS-HIS decreases the FNR by more than 
11.97, 15.3, and 25.74% those of SFA, BRUIDS, and Cyber Security System models, respectively. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Comparison of the SUAS-HIS proposed scheme, Cyber Security System, BRUIDS and SFA models in term 
of FNR. 
The comparison results of the SUAS-HIS proposed scheme, in terms of FNR at different type of 
attacks and different ST  are provided in Figure 8. 
(a) (7% malicious UAV) (b) (14% malicious UAV) 
(c) (21% malicious UAV) (d) Simulation times 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Comparison of the SUAS-HIS proposed scheme, in terms of FNR at different type of attacks and different ST . 
DR: Figure 9 shows the comparison of the SUAS-HIS proposed scheme, SFA, BRUIDS, and Cyber 
Security System models in term of DR. (a) Number of UAVs (7% malicious), (b) Number of UAVs 
(14% malicious), (c) Number of UAVs (21% malicious), and (d) Simulation times respectively. As 
shown in the Figure (a), the DR in each of the four methods is reduced according to two scenarios, 
especially when the number of malicious UAVs is high. This reduction is much higher for the Cyber 
Security System than for other mechanisms. The SUAS-HIS proposed scheme can detect all of the 
above attacks at a DR higher than 95%. This result is achieved when the number of normal UAVs 
and the rate of malicious UAVs are equal to 400 and 21%, respectively. The reason for the superiority 
of the SUAS-HIS is the rapid detection of malicious UAVs and their removal by mapping of unsafe 
and antigenic routes, which are discovered by the model trained with antibody and removed from the 
operation cycle. As shown in the Figure 9(a), (b), (c) and (d), SUAS-HIS increases the DR by more 
than 20.73, 24.4, and 37% those of SFA, BRUIDS, and Cyber Security System models, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of the SUAS-HIS proposed scheme, Cyber Security System, BRUIDS and SFA models in term 
of DR. 
(a) (7% malicious UAV) (b) (14% malicious UAV) 
(c) (21% malicious UAV) (d) Simulation times 
Figure 10 shows the comparison results of the SUAS-HIS proposed scheme, in terms of DR at 
different type of attacks and different ST . 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Comparison of the SUAS-HIS proposed scheme, in terms of DR at different type of attacks and different ST . 
PDR: Figure 11 demonstrates the relationship between PDR, number of UAVs, and Simulation 
times. With 200 active UAVs, the PDR is relatively low for three the SFA, BRUIDS, and Cyber 
Security System. The reason for this is the fact that in such conditions, some packets fail to reach 
destination in the designated timeframe. However, since increasing the number of UAVs results in 
more packets being delivered to the destination, using more UAVs would slightly improve the PDR. 
When the number of employed UAVs is 200 and 400, due to random factors occurring in simulation, 
a slight degradation is witnessed in the SUAS-HIS ratio of packet delivery. However, when the 
simulation times is in range of 600 to 1400, SUAS-HIS is capable of generally outperforming all 
current approaches. As shown in the Figure 11(a), (b), (c) and (d), SUAS-HIS increases the PDR by 
more than 18.5, 21.7, and 23.81% those of SFA, BRUIDS, and Cyber Security System models, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (7% malicious UAV) (b) (14% malicious UAV) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Comparison of the SUAS-HIS proposed scheme, Cyber Security System, BRUIDS and SFA models in term 
of PDR. 
The comparison results of the SUAS-HIS proposed scheme, in terms of PDR at different type of 
attacks and different ST  are provided in Figure 12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Figure 12: Comparison of the SUAS-HIS proposed scheme, in terms of PDR at different type of attacks and different ST  
 
The simulation was once again considered with a dynamic ST  of 0, 0.1, and 0.2 where the diagrams 
were obtained using different values of ST . As seen in the diagrams, the performance of the proposed 
method in the mentioned criteria is presented by increasing the value of parameter ST . When ST  is set 
to 0, the proposed defense mechanism (SUAS-HIS) gets activated immediately and will react to the 
operation of malicious UAVs in order to stop them and prevent lots of packets from being removed by 
the malicious UAVs. If ST  is set to 0.1, SUAS-HIS will be activated after 10 percent of the packets are 
deleted and the malicious operation will be prevented. Finally, if ST  is set to 0.2, it means that after 20 
percent of the packets are lost, SUAS-HIS will start operating. 
   As is clearly demonstrated in simulation results, employing UAVs to establish a real-time 
communication is not highly efficient. Instead, they should be potentially employed as assistive 
mediums to create or improve the level of communication in environments with special characteristics. 
(d) Simulation times (c) (21% malicious UAV) 
For instance, in Linear Sensor Networks based on UAVs or temporary communications, UAVs are an 
easy-to-deploy and low-cost means of data transfer. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
In a UAS, in order to protect the continuity of the operation, it is imperative to detect attackers, whilst 
limiting the ratios of FPR and FNR. In this paper, an IDS has been proposed in the SUAS-HIS method to 
protect against the security problems using the HIS. In the SUAS-HIS, the malicious UAV is robust against 
four lethal attacks (WH, BH, GH, and FID) so that intrusive operations are quickly identified and removed 
from the spying missions or top-secret information surveillance. The IDSs are used to detect and respond 
to attempts to compromise the target system. This design is inspired by HIS. In the mapping, insecure 
signals are equivalent to an antigen that is detected by antibody-based training patterns and removed from 
the operation cycle. Among the main uses of the proposed design are the quick detection of intrusive signals 
and quarantining their activity. SUAS-HIS is more efficient than the Cyber Security System, BRUIDS and 
SFA approaches under security threats because not only it detects the malicious node beforehand but also 
it isolates the malicious node and restore the accused node after the penalty period. In our analysis, the 
performance of our proposed SUAS-HIS scheme is evaluated using NS-3. The results confirmed that our 
scheme is capable of exhibiting high-levels of security and high ratio of detection (exceeding 92.93%). It 
addition, our proposed scheme has high PDR (more than 64.41%), low FPR (less than 6.89%), and low 
FNR (less than 3.95%), in comparison with the other approaches currently being employed. 
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